At 8:44 a.m. on June 15th, 1944, First Lieutenant Frank Tachsky crouched in a Higgins boat 300 yards from Saipan’s southern beaches as Japanese artillery shells exploded in the surf around him. The 29-year-old Marine officer from New Brighton, Pennsylvania, commanded 40 men behind him, every single one selected from the brig or punishment details, and their mission required them to work alone behind enemy lines for days at a time against an island garrison. The intelligence estimated at 30,000 Japanese troops. Tachsky’s scout sniper

platoon had trained for 6 months at Camp Terowa in Hawaii, but Saipan would be their first combat operation, and Marine Corps planners had already calculated that scout sniper casualties in the Pacific theater averaged 73%. The platoon behind Tachsky represented the Marine Corps’s second experiment with elite reconnaissance units.

 After the bloody battle of Tarowa 7 months earlier, Colonel James Rizley of the Sixth Marine Regiment had requested permission to form a specialized scout sniper platoon. The Marine Corps had lost 994 men at Teroa in just 76 hours. Rizley believed that better intelligence about Japanese fortifications could reduce those casualties.

 He needed men who could kill silently, map enemy positions, and survive alone in hostile territory. Standard Marine training produced excellent riflemen and assault troops. But Rizley needed something different. He needed men who thought for themselves, who ignored rules, who fought dirty. He found them in the punishment details. Tachsky had specific recruiting criteria.

 When two Marines got into a fight, the winner went to the brig while the loser went to the infirmary. Tachsky wanted the winner. A man with a disciplinary record for brawling had proven he could handle himself in close combat. The Marine Corps called such men troublemakers. Tachsky called them survivors. Over 2 months at Camp Tarowa, he assembled 42 Marines from various punishment details across the Second Marine Division.

 The youngest was 17. The oldest was 34. Most had criminal records before joining the Marines. Several had been arrested for theft, assault, or fighting. One had been a professional boxer. Another had worked as a bodyguard for a Chicago gangster. The Marine Corps had given these men a choice. Military prison or combat duty. They chose combat.

 Training at Camp Tarowa focused on skills the regular Marine Corps did not teach. Silent killing techniques with knives and bare hands. How to approach a sentry from behind and break his neck without making sound. How to move through jungle terrain without disturbing vegetation. How to read Japanese maps and documents.

 how to call in naval gunfire and artillery strikes. The platoon practiced with M1903 Springfield rifles fitted with eight power unit scopes. They learned to shoot from 600 yardds and hit a man-sized target. They trained with bazookas, learning to destroy tanks and fortified positions.

 They studied Japanese tactics, learning how the enemy defended islands and where they positioned troops. The platoon also learned to steal. Marines were notorious thieves by necessity. The Marine Corps was the poorest equipped branch of the American military in 1944. Marines received surplus weapons from World War I, outdated equipment, and inadequate rations.

 To survive, they stole from better supplied army and navy units. Tachsky’s men excelled at theft. They raided army supply depots for food, navy warehouses for equipment, and even stole jeeps and trucks. Other Marines in the sixth regiment nicknamed them the 40 thieves. The name stuck. By June 1944, the 40 thieves had completed their training.

 They knew how to fight, how to hide, and how to kill without making noise. They had memorized Japanese fortification patterns, and studied aerial photographs of Saipan. They understood their mission. Land with the first assault wave. Push inland ahead of the main force. Locate Japanese positions and radio coordinates back to artillery and naval gunfire units. Then disappear into the jungle and continue mapping enemy fortifications. Days at a time behind enemy lines.

 No support, no rescue if captured. The intelligence briefings had been clear about what awaited them. Saipan was the first Japanese territory the Americans would invade. The island was considered part of Japan itself, not occupied territory. The Japanese would defend it with suicidal determination.

 The garrison included 30,000 Imperial Army and Navy troops, plus thousands of armed civilians. The island measured 14 mi long and 5 mi wide. Mount Tapucha rose 1500 ft in the center, providing the Japanese with observation posts overlooking every beach. The Japanese had built concrete pill boxes, interconnected trenches, and underground bunkers throughout the island.

 They had registered every beach and valley for artillery and mortar fire. American casualties were expected to expected to exceed 50%. Want to know if Tachsky’s criminals survived what came next? Please hit that like button. It helps the algorithm show this story to more people. Subscribe for more untold history. Back to Tachsky. The Higgins boats ramp dropped into chestde water.

Tachsky led his men forward through the surf as machine gun fire kicked up spray around them. They reached the beach at 8:47 a.m. Japanese mortars began landing among the assault waves. Men died in the surf in the sand at the seaw wall. Tachavsky’s platoon moved in land fast. Their orders were simp

Keep moving. Find the Japanese. Radio their positions. Stay alive. By 9:30 a.m., they had pushed 300 yards inland, farther than any other Marine unit on the beach. They found themselves alone in enemy territory with 30,000 Japanese soldiers somewhere in the jungle ahead. Night would fall in 9 hours. That was when their real mission would begin. The 40 thieves moved through dense jungle growth 50 yards apart, maintaining visual contact through hand signals Tachsky had developed during training.

 Standard Marine tactics called for units to stay together, advance in formation, and maintain radio contact with command. Tachsky’s orders were different. His platoon would operate independently, reporting enemy positions, but making their own tactical decisions. No other Marine unit on Saipan had that authority. At 10:15 a.m., Sergeant Bill Canuple spotted the first Japanese position.

 A concrete pillbox built into the side of a ridge with interlocking fields of fire covering the valley below where the second marine division would advance later that afternoon. The pillbox housed a type 92 heavy machine gun with a crew of seven. The Japanese had camouflaged the position with vegetation and positioned it to remain invisible from the beach.

 Marine assault units advancing through the valley would walk directly into the kill zone. Tachsky’s map showed three possible routes for the Marine advance. The Japanese machine gun covered all three. Taking out the position would save dozens, possibly hundreds of Marine lives, but attacking it would reveal the 40 thieves position and compromise their reconnaissance mission.

 Tachsky made the decision in 30 seconds. The platoon had carried a bazooka specifically for situations like this. Private Marvin Strombo positioned himself 80 yard from the pillbox while the rest of the platoon provided security. At 10:32 a.m., Strombo fired one round. The rocket hit the pillbox’s firing slit and detonated inside.

 The explosion killed the entire Japanese crew instantly. Before the smoke cleared, Tachsky’s platoon had already moved 300 yards deeper into the jungle. They left no trace of their presence except the destroyed pillbox. When second Marine Division units advanced through the valley 4 hours later, they encountered no machine gun fire from that ridge.

 By noon, the 40 thieves had identified and mapped 17 Japanese positions, eight machine gun nests, four mortar pits, three artillery observation posts, and two ammunition storage areas. Tachsky radioed the coordinates back to regimental headquarters using encoded transmission protocols. Within 20 minutes, naval gunfire from destroyers offshore began hitting the targets.

 The 40 thieves watched from concealed positions as 5-in shells demolished Japanese fortifications they had marked 30 minutes earlier. This was their mission. Find the enemy, mark them for destruction, and move on before the Japanese realized what was happening.

 The platoon’s advance carried them 2 mi inland by early afternoon, well ahead of any other American unit. They moved through terrain the Marines would not reach for three more days. Every h 100 yards revealed new Japanese positions. The island was more heavily fortified than intelligence had estimated. Tachsky counted over 200 enemy soldiers in one valley alone, dug into positions that would take days of frontal assault to capture.

 But with accurate coordinates, naval gunfire could destroy those positions in minutes. The 40 thieves were changing how the Marine Corps fought. At 3:40 p.m., the platoon discovered something unexpected. A Japanese tank battalion staging area. 37 Type 97 medium tanks sat under camouflage netting in a grove north of Chiron, Canoa.

 Marine intelligence had estimated the Japanese possessed maybe a dozen tanks on Saipan. The 40 thieves had just found three times that number in one location. The tanks represented the most serious threat to the American beach head. Japanese doctrine called for mass tank attacks at night when American naval gunfire would be less effective.

 If these 37 tanks attack the beach after dark, they could potentially break through marine lines and reach the vulnerable supply areas. Tachsky immediately radioed the coordinates. The response from headquarters came back within 8 minutes. Naval gunfire was already engaged, supporting marine units pinned down near the beach. Air strikes were committed to other targets.

Artillery was still being unloaded from ships. No assets were available to hit the tank battalion for at least 4 hours. By then, it would be dark and the tanks would likely have moved. Tchovsky looked at the 37 tanks and made a calculation. His platoon carried six bazookas, six rounds per bazooka, 36 rockets total, 37 tanks. The math was almost perfect.

 The decision violated every tactical principle the Marine Corps taught. A 40-man unit does not attack a tank battalion. But Tachsky had not recruited Marines who followed principles. He had recruited men who fought dirty and survived. At 4:15 p.m., he gave the order to prepare for assault. The 40 thieves would attack the tank battalion themselves. If they succeeded, they would prevent a potential disaster at the beach head.

 If they failed, 40 men would die, and no one would ever know what happened to them in that jungle grove. Strombo checked his bazooka and counted his rockets. Six shots to kill six tanks. Then it would come down to close combat.

 Tachsky positioned his six bazooka teams in a semicircle around the tank staging area, spacing them 40 yards apart to maximize coverage. Each team consisted of a shooter and a loader. The plan was simple. hit as many tanks as possible in the first 30 seconds, then withdraw into the jungle before Japanese infantry could respond. The Marines knew they would not destroy all 37 tanks, but even disabling 10 or 15 would significantly reduce the threat to the beach head. At 4:25 p.m.

, as the teams moved into position, something changed. The Japanese tanks started their engines. The sound of 37 diesel engines roaring to life simultaneously echoed through the jungle. Japanese tank crews emerged from camouflage dugouts and climbed onto their vehicles. Officers shouted orders. Infantry units began forming up around the tanks. This was not a repositioning movement.

 This was preparation for attack. Tachavsky checked his watch. 4:28 p.m. Sunset was at 7:12 p.m. The Japanese were preparing for a dusk assault, earlier than Marine intelligence had predicted. The entire enemy force was now alert and organizing for combat. The window for a surprise attack had closed. Tachsky made a new decision.

 His platoon would shadow the tank battalion and report its movements. Attacking now would accomplish nothing except getting his men killed, but tracking the tanks and providing real-time coordinates would allow Marine units at the beach to prepare defenses. He radioed headquarters with updated information. Enemy tank battalion mobilizing for attack. Estimated time of arrival at American lines between 7 and 8:00 p.m.

The response came back immediately. Maintain observation. Do not engage. continue reporting. The tank battalion began moving at 5:07 p.m. They advanced in two columns along parallel routes toward the coast. Japanese infantry units moved alongside the tanks, approximately 1,000 soldiers total. This was a major assault, not a probing attack.

 The Japanese intended to break through marine lines and reach the beaches before nightfall. If they succeeded, they could destroy supply dumps, artillery positions, and command posts. The entire American invasion could collapse in a single evening. The 40 thieves followed the enemy formation, staying 200 yd to the flank and using jungle cover for concealment.

 Every 10 minutes, Tachsky radioed updated coordinates showing the enemy’s position and direction of movement. Marine units at the beach began repositioning to meet the threat. Bazookas were distributed to frontline units. Sherman tanks from the second marine tank battalion moved forward. Artillery batteries adjusted their aim points.

 The entire second marine division prepared to receive a masked tank attack. At 6:15 p.m., approximately 1 mile from the beach, the Japanese formation halted. Officers gathered for a conference. Tachsky observed them through binoculars from 300 yd away. The Japanese were arguing about something. One officer pointed toward the coast. Another gestured toward the north. A third officer unrolled the map.

 The conference lasted 11 minutes. Finally, the officers returned to their units and the formation changed direction. Instead of continuing straight toward the beach, the tanks turned north. The maneuver surprised Tchovsky. Marine intelligence maps showed no valuable targets in that direction.

 The area was mostly jungle and rough terrain, but the Japanese clearly had a specific objective. The formation advanced another mile north, then turned west again toward the coast. By 7:05 p.m., as the sun touched the horizon, Tachsky understood their plan. The Japanese were not attacking the main beach head.

 They were targeting the gap between the Second Marine Division and Fourth Marine Division. A successful breakthrough there would split the American forces in half. Tachsky radioed the warning, but the Japanese had chosen their timing perfectly. Dusk was falling. Radio communication became difficult as Marine units shifted frequencies for night operations.

 Artillery batteries were in the middle of ammunition resupply. Sherman tanks were refueling. The gap between divisions was defended by just two marine companies, approximately 340 men, against 37 tanks and 1,000 Japanese infantry. At 7:23 p.m., the Japanese attack began. The 40 thieves watched from elevated ground as enemy tanks rolled forward through the twilight.

 Marine defensive positions erupted with bazooka fire. The first three Japanese tanks exploded in flames, but 34 more kept coming. Japanese infantry charged behind the tanks, screaming and firing. Marines fell back from their initial positions. The Japanese breakthrough was succeeding. Within 15 minutes, enemy tanks would reach the beach.

 Tachsky looked at his six bazookas and the 34 tanks below. Then he saw something that changed everything. One Japanese tank had separated from the main formation and was heading directly toward the sixth Marine regiment’s command post where Colonel Rley was coordinating the entire divisional response. The Type 97 tank moved through the darkness at approximately 15 mph following a ravine that led directly to the command post location.

 The Japanese tank commander had identified a weakness in marine defenses. A 200yard gap where jungle terrain prevented easy positioning of anti-tank weapons. If the tank reached the command post, it could destroy radio equipment, kill senior officers, and paralyze the entire regimental response to the main attack.

 Colonel Rizley and his staff were approximately 400 yd away, completely unaware of the approaching threat. Tachsky had maybe 3 minutes to act. He grabbed Private Herbert Hajes, the best bazooka shooter in the platoon. Hajes had destroyed six targets during training at Camp Terowa without missing a single shot. But training targets did not move, did not shoot back, and did not have armor plating designed to deflect rockets.

 The Type 97’s frontal armor was 50 mm thick, enough to potentially deflect a bazooka round fired at the wrong angle. Hajes would need a perfect side shot to guarantee penetration. Tachsky and Hajes moved down the slope at a dead run, racing to intercept the tank before it reached the command post. They reached a position 30 yard from the tank’s projected path at 7:31 p.m. Hajes dropped prone and aimed the bazooka.

 The tank emerged from the ravine 20 seconds later. Its turret was rotating, searching for targets. The commander stood in the open hatch, scanning the darkness with binoculars. Hajes waited. A moving tank was harder to hit than a stationary one. He needed the perfect moment. The tank continued forward. 25 yd, 20 yard, 15 yd. Then it stopped.

 The engine idled. The commander was checking his map, trying to confirm his position. Hajes fired at 7:32 p.m. The rocket hit the tank’s left side just below the turret ring, exactly where the armor was thinnest. The shaped charge penetrated and detonated inside the crew compartment. The explosion killed all four crew members instantly.

 The tank’s ammunition cooked off 6 seconds later, and the entire vehicle erupted in flames. The fireball lit up the jungle for 300 yd in every direction. Japanese infantry advancing nearby saw the explosion and assumed they had encountered a major marine defensive position. They redirected their assault away from the command post and toward what they thought was a larger threat.

 Tchovsky’s bazooka shot had accomplished more than destroying one tank. It had inadvertently misdirected an entire Japanese infantry battalion away from the most vulnerable point in marine defenses. The command post remained secure. Colonel Rizley continued coordinating the divisional response without interruption.

 But the bazooka’s muzzle flash had revealed Tchovsky’s position to every Japanese soldier within 500 yardds. Enemy machine gunfire began raking the area where the 40 thieves were positioned. Mortar rounds started falling. The platoon had to withdraw immediately or risk being overrun. The withdrawal through jungle in darkness while under fire tested everything the 40 thieves had trained for.

 Standard procedure called for units to stay together and move as a group, but jungle terrain and enemy fire made that impossible. The platoon split into small teams of four or five men each, moving independently toward predetermined rally points. Japanese patrols were everywhere, searching for the Marines who had destroyed their tank. Several times, 40 Thieves teams found themselves within yards of enemy soldiers. They relied on silent movement and concealment rather than engaging.

One firefight would reveal their position and bring overwhelming enemy response. Private Strombo’s team encountered a Japanese patrol at 8:05 p.m. Seven enemy soldiers moving through the jungle, searching with flashlights. Strombo and three other Marines lay motionless in undergrowth as the patrol passed within 10 ft of their position.

 One Japanese soldier stopped and looked directly at the spot where Strombbo was hiding. The marine held his breath. The Japanese soldier stood there for 43 seconds, staring into the darkness. Finally, he moved on. The patrol continued past without detecting the Americans. By 900 p.m., approximately half the 40 thieves had reached the primary rally point, a small clearing 600 yd behind marine lines.

 Tachsky counted 23 men. 17 were still missing. They could be dead, captured, or simply lost in the darkness. Standard Marine procedure called for units to wait at rally points for up to 2 hours for missing personnel, but the rally point was too close to Japanese positions.

 Enemy patrols were actively searching the area. Tachsky made the decision to move the assembled group back to Marine Lines and send small rescue teams to search for the missing men after dawn. The group moved toward friendly positions at 9:17 p.m. They approached Marine Lines carefully, knowing that nervous sentries often shot at anything moving in darkness.

 Tchovsky used the pre-arranged recognition signal, three short whistles followed by two long ones. Marine sentries challenged them. Tofsky responded with the correct password. The 40 thieves crossed into friendly territory at 9:41 p.m. 23 men had made it back. 17 were still out there somewhere in the dark.

 The Japanese tank attack continued through the night. Marine defensive positions along the beach reported enemy armor probing their lines until 3:14 a.m. American bazookas destroyed 11 tanks. Sherman tanks from the second Marine tank battalion knocked out nine more. Artillery fire disabled another seven. By dawn on June 16th, the Japanese had lost 27 of their 37 tanks.

 The attack had failed, but it had cost the Marines heavily. The second battalion, sixth Marines reported 78 casualties. Company F of the Second Marines had 19 killed or wounded. The gap between divisions had held, but barely. Tchovsky assembled search teams at First Light. Each team consisted of four men with orders to locate the missing 17 Marines and return by noon.

 The teams moved back into the jungle at 6:30 a.m. retracing the platoon’s route from the previous evening. They found the first body at 7:05 a.m. Private Donald Evans had been shot twice in the chest, probably during the withdrawal under fire. He had died instantly. His dog tags were missing. The Japanese often collected American dog tags as trophies.

 The team buried Evans in a shallow grave, marked with his rifle and helmet. The second team found three more bodies at 8:20 a.m. These Marines had been captured alive, then executed. Their hands were tied behind their backs. They had been bayonetted. Japanese forces on Saipan rarely took prisoners. The Imperial Army considered surrender dishonorable and extended that contempt to enemy soldiers who surrendered.

 But these three Marines had not surrendered. They had been wounded, captured, and murdered. The search team reported the discovery to Tachsky by radio. He ordered them to continue searching for the remaining 13 missing men. By 10:00 a.m., search teams had located six of the missing Marines alive.

 They had become separated during the night withdrawal, but had successfully evaded Japanese patrols and reached Marine lines at different locations. That brought the count to 29 men accounted for. 13 were still missing. At 11:15 a.m., one of the search teams made radio contact. They had found five more Marines hiding in a cave system approximately 1 mile behind Japanese lines.

 The Marines were alive, but pinned down by enemy patrols. They could not move without being detected. Tachsky faced another decision. He could request artillery support to create a diversion, allowing the trapped Marines to escape. But artillery fire would alert the Japanese to American interest in that specific location, potentially leading to increased patrols and making future rescue attempts impossible.

 Or he could send a rescue team immediately, relying on stealth and speed to extract the trapped men before Japanese forces could respond. The first option was safer, but slower. The second option was faster but riskier. Tchopsky chose speed. He assembled a six-man rescue team and mo

ved out at 11:47 a.m. The team reached the cave system at 12:33 p.m. The five trapped Marines were exhausted and dehydrated, but uninjured. They had spent the night listening to Japanese patrols pass within yards of their hiding position. One Marine had malaria and was running a fever of 103°. Another had dysentery and could barely walk. The rescue team distributed water and medical supplies, then prepared to move.

The extraction required the team to cover one mile through Japanese controlled territory in broad daylight. Standard marine tactics called for moving in darkness, but the trapped Marines could not survive another 12 hours without medical attention. The fever case needed immediate evacuation.

 The dysentery case was severely dehydrated. Tachsky decided to move immediately and rely on speed rather than concealment. The combined group of 11 Marines began moving toward friendly lines at 10:05 p.m. They made it 400 yardds before encountering a Japanese patrol. 20 enemy soldiers moving through the jungle in a standard search formation. The Marines had two choices.

 Hide and hope the patrol passed without detecting them or ambush the patrol and eliminate the threat. Hiding risked discovery. Ambushing risked bringing more Japanese troops to investigate gunfire. Tachsky chose ambush. The element of surprise would give the Marines a brief advantage. If they could eliminate the entire patrol in 30 seconds before anyone could fire a shot or radio for help, they might escape undetected.

The Marines positioned themselves in a classic L-shaped ambush formation. Eight men along the patrols line of march. Three men at the end of the L to catch anyone who tried to escape. The Japanese walked directly into the kill zone at 1:23 p.m. Tachsky gave the signal. 11 Marines opened fire simultaneously.

 The Japanese patrol was destroyed in 7 seconds. 20 enemy soldiers killed. No survivors, no radio transmissions. But the gunfire had been heard for at least half a mile in every direction. Japanese units throughout the area would be converging on this location within minutes. The Marines moved at a full run, abandoning stealth for speed. Behind them, Japanese voices shouted commands. Whistles blew.

 The sound of enemy units mobilizing echoed through the jungle. Tachsky estimated they had maybe 5 minutes before Japanese forces surrounded them. The nearest Marine defensive position was 800 yd away across open ground that offered minimal cover. Running that distance while carrying two sick Marines would take at least 12 minutes. The mathematics were clear. The Japanese would catch them 

before they reached safety. At 1:29 p.m., the Marines encountered an unexpected problem. The terrain ahead dropped into a steep ravine 40 ft deep with near vertical sides. Going around would add 15 minutes to their route. Going down and back up would slow them significantly, but staying on the ridge meant certain contact with pursuing Japanese forces. Tachsky chose the ravine.

 The Marines descended the slope, half sliding and half climbing, supporting the two sick men between them. They reached the bottom at 1:33 p.m. Japanese soldiers appeared on the ridge above them 60 seconds later. The Japanese opened fire from elevated positions, shooting down into the ravine. Bullets ricocheted off rocks. One Marine was hit in the leg. Another took shrapnel from a grenade that exploded on the ravine floor.

 The Marines returned fire while continuing to move, using boulders and vegetation for cover. The ravine channeled them in one direction, eliminating tactical options. They could only move forward and hope to reach the far end before the Japanese descended and engaged them 

at close range. At 1:38 p.m. they spotted the problem. The ravine ended in a box canyon. No exit. The Marines were trapped. Japanese soldiers began descending into the ravine from multiple points, moving to surround the trapped Americans. Tachsky counted at least 40 enemy soldiers visible with more arriving every minute. His 11 Marines had maybe 200 rounds of ammunition total between them.

 The two sick Marines could not fight effectively. That left nine combat effective men against a force that was growing rapidly. Artillery support was impossible because the Marines were too close to Japanese positions. Air strikes could not be called in without risking hitting friendly forces. The 40 thieves were on their own.

 Tachsky noticed something the Japanese had missed. The box canyon’s rear wall was not solid rock. Vegetation growing at the base suggested water seepage, which meant a crack or fissure in the stone. He sent two Marines to investigate while the rest of the team 

established defensive positions. The two Marines reported back at 1:44 p.m. There was a narrow opening behind the vegetation, barely wide enough for a man to squeeze through. Beyond the opening, the fissure widened into a passageway that appeared to lead upward through the rock. The Marines began moving through the opening one at a time, pushing the two sick men through first.

 The passage was tight enough that men had to remove their packs and drag them behind. It was completely dark inside. They moved by touch, following the marine ahead. The passage climbed steeply upward through solid rock.

 Behind them, they could hear Japanese soldiers entering the box canyon, calling to each other as they searched for the Americans who had seemingly disappeared. The passage emerged onto the opposite side of the ridge at 2:07 p.m. 400 yd from where they had entered. The Marines found themselves behind Japanese lines, but with the enemy focused on searching the ravine below. They moved quickly toward Marine positions, covering the final 600 yd in 8 minutes.

 They approached friendly lines using proper recognition signals and crossed into American held territory at 2:23 p.m. All 11 Marines reached safety. The two sick men were immediately evacuated to medical stations. That brought the total count to 34 Marines accounted for. Eight remained missing. As the day progressed, three more were found alive, having successfully evaded capture and reached Marine lines independently.

 Two more bodies were discovered by advancing Marine units. That left three Marines still unaccounted for by nightfall on June 16th. They were officially listed as missing in action. The 40 thieves had lost at least six men killed in their first 48 hours on Saipan. Another three were missing and presumed dead. That represented a 22% casualty rate. Despite the losses, the platoon had accomplished its mission.

They had identified over 200 Japanese positions, called in coordinates that destroyed dozens of enemy fortifications, prevented a tank from reaching the regimental command post, and provided critical intelligence on enemy movements. Colonel Rizley sent a message to Tachsky. At 1,800 hours, the 40 thieves would have one night to rest, resupply, and integrate replacements.

 At dawn on June 17th, they would return to the jungle. This time, their mission would take them even deeper behind enemy lines. The Japanese garrison on Saipan still numbered approximately 29,000 troops. The 40 thieves now numbered 37 men.

 At 0530 hours on June 17th, the 40 thieves moved out from marine lines in complete darkness. Their objective was a ridge system 3 mi inland that Marine intelligence believed contained Japanese artillery positions. Those guns had been shelling American positions continuously for 2 days, killing dozens of Marines and disrupting supply operations. Aerial reconnaissance could not locate the guns because the Japanese had camouflaged them inside caves.

 Only ground reconnaissance could find them. The mission required the 40 thieves to penetrate deeper behind enemy lines than any American unit had yet gone on Saipan. The platoon moved in complete silence using hand signals for communication. They covered the first mile in 47 minutes without encountering Japanese patrols.

 The second mile took longer because the terrain became increasingly difficult. Steep slopes, dense vegetation, and rocky ground slowed their advance. They reached the target ridge system at 0815 hours and began systematic reconnaissance. The ridge stretched for approximately 2 mi and rose 600 ft above the surrounding jungle. Japanese positions were everywhere.

 Tachsky counted eight cave entrances large enough to hide artillery pieces. The caves were connected by tunnels that allowed the Japanese to move guns between positions, fire several rounds, then relocate before American counter fire could respond. This explained why marine artillery had failed to destroy the enemy guns.

 They were shooting at positions the Japanese had already abandoned. Finding the guns was only part of the mission. The 40 Thieves also needed to map the tunnel system so Marine assault units would know how to attack when they reached this area. Mapping the tunnels required entering them. At 0940 hours, Corporal Rosco Mullins and Private Strombo volunteered to penetrate the cave system while the rest of the platoon provided security outside.

 The two Marines entered the largest cave opening and moved into darkness using small flashlights shielded to prevent light from being visible more than a few feet away. The cave extended 200 ft into the ridge before branching into multiple passages. They could hear Japanese voices echoing from somewhere deeper in the system. Water dripped from the ceiling. The air smelled of gunpowder and human waste.

 They found the first artillery piece at 01012 hours, a type 91 105 mm howitzer positioned 30 ft inside a side passage with ammunition stored in recesses carved into the rock walls. The gun crew was absent, probably sleeping in a different section of the cave system.

 Mullins and Strombo marked the location on their map and continued deeper. They discovered two more guns in the next 40 minutes, plus a command post, an ammunition magazine containing approximately 2,000 rounds, and sleeping quarters for at least 60 soldiers. The tunnel system was far more extensive than intelligence had estimated. At 11:03 hours, they heard Japanese soldiers approaching. Mullins and Strobo had maybe 15 seconds to find concealment before being discovered.

 They pressed themselves into a small al cove and remained motionless as a dozen enemy soldiers walked past, conversing in Japanese. The soldiers passed within 3 ft without detecting the Americans. After the patrol moved on, the two Marines decided to exit the cave system. They had gathered enough intelligence. Staying longer risked capture or discovery.

 They emerged at 11:27 hours and rejoined the platoon. Tachsky examined their map. The tunnel system connected all eight cave entrances and contained at least six artillery pieces, possibly more. Standard marine assault tactics would fail against this position. Infantry could not storm the caves because machine guns covered every entrance. Artillery fire would be ineffective because the caves were too deep.

 The only solution was to seal the entrances, trapping the Japanese inside, then systematically destroy each sealed position with demolitions. But that required marine engineers with explosives, and those units were still days away from reaching this area. At 12:15 hours, the platoon began moving toward their secondary objective, the town of Gapan, Saipan’s administrative capital before the war.

 Marine intelligence wanted to know if Japanese forces were defending the town or if they had withdrawn to more defensible positions inland. Reaching Garapan required crossing four miles of enemy controlled territory in broad daylight, but the 40 thieves had successfully operated undetected for over 30 hours. Tachsky believed they could complete one more reconnaissance mission before withdrawing to marine lines.

 They approached Garrapan from the east at 1540 hours. The town had been heavily bombed by American aircraft and shelled by naval gunfire. Most buildings were destroyed or damaged, but the 40 thieves could see Japanese soldiers moving through the ruins, indicating the enemy still maintained a presence.

 Tachsky needed closer reconnaissance to determine enemy strength and positions. At 1605 hours, he made a decision that would become legendary in Marine Corps history. Five Marines would enter Garapan in broad daylight, conduct reconnaissance, and return with intelligence.

 The mission was virtually suicidal, but it was also exactly the kind of operation the 40 thieves had been created to perform. Tachsky selected four marines for the Gapan reconnaissance. Strombo Mullins, Corporal Irazi, and Private Dawn Evans. Five men total, including himself. They removed all equipment that might make noise, cantens, extra ammunition, grenades. They carried only rifles, knives, and sidearms.

 At 1623 hours, they moved toward Garapon’s eastern edge. The ruins provided excellent cover, but also concealed Japanese positions. Every destroyed building could hide enemy soldiers. Every pile of rubble could be a defensive position. They entered the town at 1641 hours, moving through back streets and staying in shadows.

 Japanese soldiers were everywhere. The Marines counted at least 200 enemy troops visible in the town center with probably hundreds more in surrounding buildings. The Japanese were not defending Gapon as a fortified position. They were using it as a staging area for counterattacks against American forces. The distinction was important.

 Marine commanders planning to assault Gapon needed to know they would face mobile enemy units rather than fixed fortifications. At 1708 hours, Kazzy spotted something unexpected. Five bicycles leaning against the partially destroyed building. Japanese military bicycles, the type officers used for transportation between positions. An idea formed immediately.

 Five bicycles, five marines. They could conduct their reconnaissance while riding through town like Japanese soldiers moving between positions. In the chaos and destruction of Gapon, five men on bicycles would attract less attention than five men on foot trying to hide. The plan was audacious and completely violated standard reconnaissance procedures. Tachsky approved it instantly.

 The Marines took the bicycles and began riding through Gapon at 1715 hours. They moved casually, not trying to hide, just five soldiers on bicycles navigating through ruins. Japanese troops ignored them. Some waved, others shouted greetings in Japanese that the Marines did not understand, but acknowledged with hand gestures.

 For 43 minutes, the 40 thieves rode through the enemy capital, mapping positions, counting troops, and identifying supply dumps. They passed within yards of Japanese officers who never suspected the Americans riding bicycles were enemy reconnaissance. At 1758 hours, they completed their circuit through Gautapon and exited the town, heading north.

 They continued riding the bicycles for another mile before abandoning them and moving back into the jungle. The reconnaissance had provided detailed intelligence on enemy dispositions throughout Gautapon. Marine commanders would now know exactly where Japanese forces were concentrated when they eventually assaulted the town. The 40 thieves reached marine lines at 1932 hours.

 They had been behind enemy lines for 14 hours and had penetrated deeper into Japanese territory than any other American unit. Over the next 3 weeks, the 40 thieves continued similar missions. They mapped enemy positions throughout Saipan’s interior, called in coordinates for artillery strikes, ambushed Japanese patrols, and provided intelligence that saved countless Marine lives.

 They witnessed Japanese atrocities. Civilians forced to jump from cliffs rather than surrender. Wounded Marines used as bait for ambushes. Prisoners executed. The platoon operated in small teams, sometimes for days without contact with marine units. They suffered from malaria, dysentery, heat exhaustion, and tropical diseases. They ran out of food and stole from Japanese supply dumps.

They ran out of water and drank from contaminated streams. By July 9th, when Saipan was declared secure, the 40 thieves had lost 12 men killed and nine wounded. That represented a 56% casualty rate, below the 73% average for scout sniper units, but still devastating.

 The survivors were physically and mentally exhausted. Most had lost 30 to 40 lb. Several had malaria fevers. All had seen things that would haunt them for the rest of their lives. But they had accomplished their mission. Marine commanders estimated the 40 thieves reconnaissance work had reduced overall marine casualties by at least 15% potentially saving 2,000 lives.

 The platoon would go on to fight at Tinian in July 1944, then return to Saipan for mopping up operations. After the war, most members struggled with what would later be recognized as post-traumatic stress disorder. Many had recurring nightmares. Some turned to alcohol. Several could not maintain civilian employment or personal relationships. The psychological cost of their service was never officially recognized or treated.

 Frank Tachsky returned to civilian life and became mayor of Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin. He never spoke about the war. His son, Joseph, only learned about the 40 Thieves after finding his father’s foot locker following his death in 2011. The story of the platoon that had changed Marine Corps tactics remained largely unknown for 66 years.

 The scout sniper platoon of the sixth marine regiment was one of the first elite special operations units in American military history. Their tactics of deep reconnaissance, silent killing, and independent operations behind enemy lines would influence the development of modern special forces units, including Navy Seals and Marine Force reconnaissance.

 They proved that small, highly trained units could accomplish missions that entire battalions could not. 40 men recruited from Briggs and Punishment Details became one of the most effective combat units in the Pacific War. The Marines who called them criminals were wrong. They were warriors. If Lieutenant Tachsky’s story moved you, please hit that like button. It helps YouTube show these forgotten stories to more people who need to hear them.

 Hit subscribe and turn on notifications. We publish new untold history stories every day and you won’t want to miss them. Drop a comment right now and tell us where you’re watching from. Are you in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or somewhere else. Our community stretches across the world. You’re part of keeping these memories alive.

 Tell us in the comments, did any of your relatives serve in World War II, especially in the Pacific Theater? Thank you for watching. Frank Tachsky and his 40 thieves deserve to be remembered. These men sacrificed everything so future generations could live in freedom. You’re helping make that happen by watching, liking, and sharing these stories. Never forget.